TY - JOUR
T1 - Institutional mechanisms to keep unburnable fossil fuel reserves in the soil
AU - Pellegrini, Lorenzo
AU - Arsel, Murat
AU - Orta-Martínez, Martí
AU - Mena, Carlos F.
AU - Muñoa, Gorka
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors
PY - 2021/2
Y1 - 2021/2
N2 - To limit the probable increase in global mean temperature to 2 °C, about 80%, 50% and 30% of existing coal, gas and oil reserves, respectively, would need to remain under the soil. While the concept of ‘unburnable fuels’ has become prominent, there has been little discussion on institutional mechanisms to identify specific fossil fuel reserves to be left untouched and the financial mechanisms for raising and distributing funds to compensate the right-holders for forgoing extraction. We present an auction mechanism to determine the fossil fuel reserves to be kept untapped – those whose extraction would generate the least rents, ensuring cost efficiency. The auctions could be complemented by other provisions to reap collateral benefits of avoided extraction, for example by prioritizing reserves that coincide with outstanding socio-environmental values that are likely to be disrupted by the extraction of fossil fuels. We also discuss how to raise funds, for example through a fossil fuel producers-based tax, to finance the mechanism compensating right-holders and ensuring commitment. The effective identification of unburnable fossil fuel reserves and the development of accompanying funding mechanisms seems to be the elephant in the room of climate negotiations and we aim at contributing to an overdue discussion on supply-side interventions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
AB - To limit the probable increase in global mean temperature to 2 °C, about 80%, 50% and 30% of existing coal, gas and oil reserves, respectively, would need to remain under the soil. While the concept of ‘unburnable fuels’ has become prominent, there has been little discussion on institutional mechanisms to identify specific fossil fuel reserves to be left untouched and the financial mechanisms for raising and distributing funds to compensate the right-holders for forgoing extraction. We present an auction mechanism to determine the fossil fuel reserves to be kept untapped – those whose extraction would generate the least rents, ensuring cost efficiency. The auctions could be complemented by other provisions to reap collateral benefits of avoided extraction, for example by prioritizing reserves that coincide with outstanding socio-environmental values that are likely to be disrupted by the extraction of fossil fuels. We also discuss how to raise funds, for example through a fossil fuel producers-based tax, to finance the mechanism compensating right-holders and ensuring commitment. The effective identification of unburnable fossil fuel reserves and the development of accompanying funding mechanisms seems to be the elephant in the room of climate negotiations and we aim at contributing to an overdue discussion on supply-side interventions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
KW - Abatement policies
KW - Climate change
KW - Efficient climate policies
KW - Global warming
KW - Greenhouse gas emissions
KW - Market-based policy instruments
KW - Unburnable fossil fuel reserves
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85096569019&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112029
DO - 10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112029
M3 - Artículo
AN - SCOPUS:85096569019
SN - 0301-4215
VL - 149
JO - Energy Policy
JF - Energy Policy
M1 - 112029
ER -